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SOCIAL PLURALISM IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TELEVISION BROADCASTING  
 
Abstract. This paper measures social pluralism in the most popular free-to-air TV groups in Italy 
(Rai, a state-controlled company, and Mediaset, owned by Berlusconi’s family) between 2008 and 
2014. Media social pluralism is the ability of the mass media to describe and take into account the 
different categories of citizens in a society. The Italian Authority for Telecommunications regularly 
collects data on the airtime devoted to 22 “social actors” during newscasts. Our findings show that 
the public TV broadcaster shows a wider internal social pluralism than Mediaset. The data also 
reveal significant inter-group differences (external pluralism). The degree of internal and external 
pluralism decreased when Silvio Berlusconi served as Prime Minister.  
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SOCIAL PLURALISM IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TELEVISION BROADCASTING  
 
 
Introduction 
Freedom of speech and expression is fundamental to liberal democracies. However, freedom of expression 
can only be implemented in a pluralistic media environment. In the last fifty years pluralism has been 
frequently associated with the diversity of opinions and points of view that the mass media convey. The 
intersections between the mass media and the various forms of pluralism are so widespread that the 
European Union, in 2009, launched a project to assess the risks for media pluralism in the EU Member 
States (Media Pluralism Monitor) and to measure the degree of pluralism in some Members of the 
European Union with a set of indicators (http://cmpf.eui.eu/). The Federal Communication Commission 
also commissioned a number of studies between 2006 and 2010 to address the diversity of media content 
and its relationship with market structure and intensity of competition (https://www.fcc.gov/general/2010-
media-ownership-studies). 
However, the social dimension of pluralism has been rarely explored. Social pluralism has a wide-ranging 
scope since it regards cultural, ethnic, professional, political, institutional and geographical differences. This 
paper concentrates on social pluralism in the media, which is the ability of the mass media to describe and 
take into account the different categories of citizens in a society. Hence, the present study adopts what 
Valke (2011) calls the “reflective dimension” of pluralism, which “can be conceived and interpreted in a 
socio-demographic sense to refer to the proportional representation of different communities in the 
media” (p. 207).  
Our empirical analysis concerns the degree of social pluralism in the most popular free-to-air TV platforms 
in Italy (Rai and Mediaset) between 2008 and 2014. The data were collected by the Italian Authority for 
Telecommunications and Media Industries (AgCom) and consist of the airtime devoted, during newscasts, 
to distinct and representative social categories of Italian society (“social actors”). To our knowledge, this is 
the first systematic data collection and measurement of social pluralism by an authority in an advanced 
country.  
We had three main objectives. Firstly, we aimed to assess the degree of internal social pluralism, that is, 
the distribution of airtime amongst social actors within the state-controlled TV channels1 (Rai 1, Rai 2 and 
Rai 3) and, separately, within the three Mediaset channels controlled by Berlusconi’s family (Rete 4, Canale 
5 and Italia 1). Internal pluralism is important for many reasons. For example, much legislation explicitly 
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considers internal pluralism as one of the main objectives of public broadcasting (for example, the "Mammì 
Bill" in Italy, issued on 6 August 1990, the Polish Broadcasting Act in 1992, and the Spanish Act 17/2006 of 5 
June 2006 on National Public Radio and TV). In addition, the private or public control of a TV “group” would 
be barely defensible without a minimum level of content diversity between the group's channels.  
Secondly, we evaluated the differences in social pluralism between private and state-controlled free-to-air 
television channels (external pluralism). Rai and Mediaset have dominated Italian television broadcasting 
since the adoption of the Mammì Bill in 1990, which sanctioned the status quo and left Berlusconi’s control 
over commercial television unchallenged. External pluralism can balance the risk of homogenization in a 
quasi-duopoly television system, where competition for viewers can lead to minimal differentiation of 
television content. This analysis is also interesting in terms of observing which categories of social actors 
are favoured by each platform2.  
Thirdly, we studied the degree of stability of social pluralism by assessing whether the distribution of 
airtime across social actors was affected by Berlusconi’s cabinet (2008-2011). If public and private channels 
are slanted towards specific and different social classes, such differences should have decreased when 
Berlusconi controlled both Rai and Mediaset, though indirectly.  
This paper does not deal with the “optimal” distribution of TV airtime among social actors, for two reasons. 
First, AgCom collects airtime data without considering the possible overlap of social actors. Hence, we 
cannot ascertain whether the airtime devoted to one social actor is proportional to his/her relative weight 
in society. Second, the share of people belonging to a social category does not necessarily reflect its 
political, social, economic or cultural importance in a given society, which is subjective: each social actor 
would argue that he/she merits more attention. 
We can sum up the results of our empirical analysis as follows. In terms of intra-group differences, the 
public TV broadcaster (Rai) shows a larger social pluralism than in private broadcasting (Mediaset). The 
degree of internal social pluralism of public TV is asymmetric, because one of its channels (Rai 3) is 
significantly different from the others (Rai 1 and Rai 2). The data also reveal significant inter-group 
differences (external pluralism). Rai assigns more airtime to supranational actors, the European Union, 
actors related to the Italian constitution, non-Italian political and institutional actors, trade unions, 
professional associations and individuals related to arts and culture. On the other hand, Mediaset favours 
public institutions, military and police forces, mass media, professionals, criminal offenders and ordinary 
people. Most of the differences relate to “speaking time”. Finally, the differentiation between Rai and 
Mediaset is fairly stable, although selected exogenous factors affect the degree of social pluralism of Rai 
and Mediaset in the period under review. In particular, Berlusconi’s administration is negatively and 
significantly correlated with internal and external pluralism. 
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The next section briefly reviews the literature related to social pluralism. The third section outlines the 
institutional and economic framework of the Italian broadcasting system. The fourth section describes the 
data and presents the summary statistics, while the fifth section reports the results of the empirical 
analysis. The last section concludes the paper by discussing the limitations of the present research and its 
possible future developments. 
 
Related literature 
The economic literature regarding diversity in media markets has rarely dealt with social issues, but at the 
same time provides an important theoretical background to the present analysis. Since Steiner's seminal 
study in 1952, much research has explored the incentive of TV stations, newspapers and other media 
outlets to provide content variety (Spence and Owen, 1977; Waterman, 1990; Rogers and Woodbury, 1996; 
Gabszewicz et al., 2001; Mangani, 2003; Gal-Or and Dukes, 2003; Gabszewicz et al., 2004; Waterman, 2005 
among others).  
Advertising-based companies are motivated to provide popular content (information or entertainment) to 
satisfy the preferences of large mass audiences, because the advertisers’ willingness to pay increases with 
audience size. This strategy may lead to minimal content differentiation and harsh competition between 
media companies, and few firms will deliberately provide specialized and less popular content to satisfy the 
preferences of niche audiences. In this respect, free-to-air TV is an appropriate unit of analysis: advertising 
is the only source of income (apart from licence fee-based contributions in state-controlled TV services) and 
a large audience is required in order to break even. From the perspective of social representation, large 
groups of citizens, compared to minorities, have a greater ability to organize their interests and be visible in 
the mass media. Public broadcasting can alleviate this asymmetry and ensure all social actors have visibility 
on TV and the opportunity to express their ideas without too much mediation (granting, for example, 
minimum speaking time during newscasts). The focus on minorities is thus a major goal of public 
broadcasting, in addition to ensuring universal geographical accessibility, contributing to national identity 
and sense of community, and guaranteeing distance from vested interests (Cushion, 2012).  
As explained by Rennhoff and Wilbur (2014), media diversity is a multidimensional concept because it 
regards the source of content (for example, how many media companies are active in a specific industry), 
the characteristics of content (which topics are covered and the space devoted to each topic), and the way 
content is presented (viewpoint diversity). While several studies have analysed content diversity from an 
empirical perspective, the measurement of viewpoint diversity raises serious questions, since it depends 
both on the preferences of users (e.g., readers, viewers) and on the different media content3.  
The methodology of this paper is similar to that used by George and Oberholzer-Gee (2011), who consider 
the issues covered in news programmes in order to calculate an index of media diversity. However, our 
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contribution differs from previous studies in two respects. Firstly, our concept of “social pluralism” lies 
between content diversity and viewpoint diversity, since we consider the distribution of the TV airtime 
across different social actors. Thus, diversity is provided by the programming choice of TV stations and by 
the participation of social actors who have the opportunity to express their viewpoint. Secondly, this paper 
compares public and private broadcasting in terms of social pluralism, given the importance of public TV 
stations in Europe. Hence, we do not consider the impact of media ownership changes on media diversity 
(also because the Italian television industry has been structurally paralysed over the last thirty years).  
A closely related paper to ours is Durante and Knight's (2012), who show that the news content of the 
Italian public broadcasting service is affected by the identity of the political majority. In addition, Durante 
and Knight (2012) used individual survey data and found evidence that viewers respond to changes in the 
political majority by modifying the choice of their favourite news programs. The political slant of 
newspapers and TV channels arises through explicit endorsement, the deliberate choice of words and 
expressions or coverage of topics appreciated by specific social classes. Political bias and social bias are thus 
strictly related. The decision to allocate more airtime to a specific social class denotes the intention to 
satisfy its political preferences, especially when the political orientation within that social class is 
sufficiently homogeneous.  
Finally, this paper draws upon a number of studies in the social and political sciences that focus on the 
intersection between the normative/positive aspects of pluralism and the role played by the mass media 
(Humphreys, 1996; Gunther and Mughan, 2000; Besley et al., 2002; Hitchens, 2006; Czepek et al., 2009; 
Chomsky and Herman, 2010). These works explore the multiple dimensions of social and cultural pluralism 
in detail. However, they have rarely explored the quantitative dimension of the issues debated. 
 
The Italian television broadcasting system: main characteristics 
Two main national companies dominate the Italian (free) broadcasting television system. Rai, the state-
controlled company, and Mediaset, controlled by Berlusconi’s family through the Fininvest holding. Both 
companies operate three major national terrestrial TV stations: Rai 1, Rai 2 and Rai 3 on the one hand, and 
Canale 5, Italia 1 and Rete 4 on the other. Rai and Mediaset together have a share of approximately 90% of 
the TV audience of free terrestrial digital television. The closest competitor, La7, formerly controlled by the 
Telecom group and purchased by Cairo Communications in 2013, had an audience share of 4-5% in January 
2014.  
Mediaset was founded by Silvio Berlusconi and developed throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Berlusconi became the main candidate of the centre-right coalitions in 1994 and abandoned formal 
management of his media group. However, the control of Mediaset by Berlusconi’s family, in particular 
through his daughter Marina and son Piersilvio, has always been clear and consistent. This situation, which 
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is unique in advanced countries, has raised serious concerns regarding a conflict of interest. The concerns 
were amplified when Berlusconi was the Italian Prime Minister (1994; 2001-2005; 2005-2006; 2008-2011). 
In fact, the political majority is strictly linked to the Rai group and the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
formally owns the Rai company4. Many argue that during his cabinet, Berlusconi was able to virtually 
control the information and entertainment content of broadcasting television (Hine, 2001; Hibberd, 2007).  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the broadcasting dominion of Rai and Mediaset was threatened by 
several events. First, Sky TV, using the satellite platform, consistently increased its audience, convincing 
Italian viewers to pay to access some programs, especially sports and movies. Broadly speaking, the 
development of pay TV has led to a decline in the advertising revenues of free-to-air TV channels. Second, 
the digital television transition, which started in 2008 and was completed in 2012, expanded the number of 
frequencies available to operators and viewers, bringing more competition and market fragmentation. In 
theory, a higher number of channels increases content diversity, with some channels being explicitly 
devoted to specific topics. Thus, the digital system has benefited viewers/consumers as a consequence of 
an enhanced matching between heterogeneous preferences and program characteristics.  
At the same time, Rai and Mediaset have continued to control the market with their old and new digital 
channels. Rai operates eleven channels in addition to the three major ones, while Mediaset has launched 
eight new channels. In November 2014, the six most popular channels in the old analogue system (Rai 1, 
Rai 2, Rai 3, Canale 5, Retequattro, Italia 1) maintained a large market share: according to Auditel5, together 
they held an average share of 62% between 20.30 and 22.30. In terms of all the digital terrestrial channels, 
Mediaset and Rai had a share of 74.2% (both shares are calculated from total digital terrestrial platforms, 
that is, advertising-based and pay TV stations).  
 
Data and summary statistics 
The Italian independent authority for telecommunications and mass media industries (AgCom) is the main 
data source. AgCom is responsible for "ensuring equitable conditions for fair market competition and 
protecting the fundamental rights of all citizens”. AgCom conducts a monthly review of the “social actors” 
that appear in the most popular free-to-air television channels: Rai 1, Rai 2, Rai 3, Canale 5, Retequattro, 
Italia 1, La 7, plus other free digital terrestrial channels with smaller audiences: La7d, MTV Italia, 
SkytgRai24, Cielo, La Effe, Deejay Tv.  
The social actors are included in a list of 22 macro-categories: supranational actors (UN, NATO, etc.), 
European Union (European Commission, European Parliament, etc.), constitutional actors (Head of State, 
Prime Minister, etc.), public institutions (Antitrust Authority, AgCom, etc.), non-Italian political and 
institutional actors, political parties and movements, local institutions, magistrates and courts, military and 
police forces, the Vatican and other religious institutions, relevant associations for social pluralism 
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(sustainability organizations, consumer associations, etc.), “special” actors (children, senior citizens, youth, 
disabled, etc.), economic and financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, etc.), trade unions and 
professional associations, mass media, professionals, research institutions, scientists and experts, 
individuals related to arts and culture (e.g., artists, cultural foundations) and show business, athletes active 
in sports competitions, individuals related to crime (e.g., suspects, prisoners, victims), and ordinary citizens. 
The empirical analysis considers only the major public TV channels (Rai 1, Rai 2, Rai 3) and the Mediaset 
channels (Retequattro, Canale 5, Italia 1) and focuses on the AgCom data collected during the newscasts. In 
fact, newscasts have two important characteristics: regularity and popularity, thus making the data stable 
and homogeneous enough to be analysed statistically. To measure the frequency of social actors during TV 
newscasts, AgCom calculates the news time, speaking time and broadcasting time. The news time is the 
airtime devoted to the coverage of questions and events associated with a social actor. The speaking time 
is the airtime in which a social actor speaks directly to the public through statements or interviews, and the 
broadcasting time is the sum of speaking time and news time.  
The distinction between news and speaking time is important and affects the interpretation of the results. 
News time can include both positive and negative reports, while speaking time is an opportunity for a social 
actor to express his/her views without mediation, although journalists and interviewers can affect the 
emotional response of the audience before, during and after the appearance of a social actor.  
The dataset ranges from the beginning of the AgCom monitoring in January 2008 to August 2014 (with 
some months missing), with a total of 1584 observations for each channel. Table 1 aggregates the 
observations of the Rai and Mediaset channels and shows the share of airtime devoted to social actors. 
Looking at total airtime, constitutional actors and political parties are given the highest visibility. If we 
consider Rai and Mediaset together, constitutional and political actors account for 61% of total airtime. For 
example, the average time devoted on a monthly basis to political parties and movements is 65 hours, 51 
minutes and 15 seconds. Other actors with high visibility are foreign politicians, the Vatican, trade/labour 
unions, and individuals linked to crime. 
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TABLE 1 
Percentage of airtime devoted to social actors in free-to-air Italian TV newscasts, January 2008 - August 
2014 
  Rai Mediaset 
 Social actors NT ST BT NT ST BT 
1 Supranational actors 1.0% 0.3% 0.8% 0.7% 0.1% 0.5% 
2 European Union 2.4% 0.6% 1.8% 1.8% 0.6% 1.3% 
3 Constitutional actors 32.0% 23.3% 29.2% 29.9% 19.4% 25.7% 
4 Public Institutions 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.8% 1.4% 
5 Non Italian political and institutional actors 7.1% 0.4% 4.9% 6.5% 0.2% 4.0% 
6 Political parties and movements  34.4% 31.2% 33.4% 31.9% 33.9% 32.7% 
7 Local institutions 2.7% 3.4% 2.9% 3.2% 2.6% 2.9% 
8 Magistrates and courts 1.1% 3.3% 1.8% 1.5% 2.3% 1.8% 
9 Military and police forces 0.7% 3.4% 1.5% 1.3% 3.0% 2.0% 
10 Vatican and other religious institutions 4.8% 3.5% 4.4% 4.8% 2.0% 3.7% 
11 Associations relevant for social pluralism 0.5% 1.7% 0.9% 0.5% 1.0% 0.7% 
12 Special actors 0.1% 0.8% 0.4% 0.2% 0.6% 0.3% 
13 Economic and financial institutions 2.7% 1.7% 2.4% 3.0% 2.0% 2.6% 
14 Trade unions and professional associations 3.4% 3.7% 3.5% 3.1% 2.4% 2.8% 
15 Mass media 0.8% 2.7% 1.4% 0.9% 5.5% 2.8% 
16 Professionals 0.3% 3.3% 1.2% 0.4% 3.6% 1.7% 
17 Research institutions, scientists and experts 0.2% 1.5% 0.6% 0.2% 1.1% 0.6% 
18 Individuals related to arts and culture 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
19 Individuals related to show business 0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.4% 
20 Athletes 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 
21 Individuals linked to crime 3.9% 5.5% 4.4% 8.0% 7.8% 7.9% 
22 Ordinary people  0.0% 7.2% 2.3% 0.0% 8.6% 3.5% 
Notes. NT=news time. ST=speaking time. BT=broadcasting time. Broadcasting time is the sum of news and 
speaking time. Percentages are calculated on the news or speaking time devoted to social actors by each group. 
 
The variability in social pluralism over the years is one of the focuses of the research. Figures 1 and 2 show 
the coefficient of variation of the share of airtime in Rai and Mediaset channels, split into news and 
speaking time. 
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FIGURE 1 
News time, normalized standard deviation, 2008-2014. Normalized standard deviation of the 
distribution of news time among 22 social actors on the Y-axis. Months on the X-axis. 
Source: AgCom.  
 
FIGURE 2 
Speaking time, normalized standard deviation, 2008-2014. Normalized standard deviation of 
the distribution of broadcasting time among 22 social actors on the Y-axis. Months on the X-
axis. 
Source: AgCom. 
 
 
What is immediately evident is that the Rai and Mediaset series are similar both in terms of news and 
speaking time. In other words, the factors that affect the variance in airtime devoted to social actors, that 
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is, the sequence and combination of events, have a similar impact on Rai and Mediaset newscasts. In 
addition, the coefficient of variation remains between 1.50 and 2.50. However, specific events (some of 
which will be considered in the next section) can alter the allocation of airtime across different social 
actors, they do not greatly affect the overall distribution of news and speaking time. The highest peak, for 
both series, occurred during the last electoral period: January-February 2013. Though similar, the Rai and 
Mediaset series shown in Figures 1 and 2 may hide some differences in the distribution of news and 
speaking time across different social actors. The next section sheds some lights on this issue. 
 
Empirical analysis 
Internal and external pluralism: basic measures 
The first objective of the empirical analysis was to assess the degree of internal social pluralism. We 
investigated whether TV channels, within the public and private groups, differ in terms of airtime devoted, 
during newscasts, to social actors. The variable of interest is the share of airtime devoted to social actors 1 
to 22 (see Table 1) in the 72 months under review. We thus measured the association between actors and 
channels within each group (that is, we considered 3x22 tables). Table 2 shows the results of a chi square 
test, along with Cramer’s V, a relative index of association, for news time, speaking time and broadcasting 
time.  
 
TABLE 2 
Rai and Mediaset: internal and external social pluralism 
  News time Speaking time Broadcasting time 
RAI 
chi2 1.0e05*** 1.3e05*** 2.1e05*** 
Cramer’s V 0.078  0.125 0.090 
MEDIASET 
chi2 1.9e05*** 5.3e05*** 7.6e05*** 
Cramer’s V 0.121 0.251 0.189 
RAI/MEDIASET 
chi2 1.6e05*** 1.5e05*** 3.0e05*** 
Cramer’s V 0.106 0.134 0.114 
Significance level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, p***<0.01. 
 
The differences within the Rai and Mediaset channels are significant: Rai1, Rai2 and Rai3 differ in terms of 
airtime devoted to social actors, as do the Mediaset channels. At the same time, Mediaset shows a lower 
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degree of internal pluralism compared to Rai: although the observed chi square for Mediaset channels is 
higher, the normalized measure of association (Cramer’s V) reveals that the association between actors and 
channels is higher within the Mediaset group6. In both groups, the differences in speaking time prevail over 
the differences in news time.  A proportion test (not shown here) reveals that the diversity within the Rai 
group is asymmetric: relative to broadcasting time, the difference between Rai 1 and Rai 2 is significant at 
the 0.01 level only for three social actors, while the Rai 3 newscasts show many significant differences 
compared to both Rai 1 and Rai 2. Within the Mediaset group, the differentiation between Retequattro, 
Canale 5 and Italia 1 channels is less asymmetric.  
The combination of airtime that public or private channels devote to different actors determines the 
degree of external social pluralism. Here, we leave aside the individual channels and focus on the 
differences between the two groups in terms of the amount of coverage given to specific actors coverage. 
The last two rows of Table 2 show the results of a chi square test and a Cramer’s V test when we consider 
the Rai and Mediaset channels in aggregate. Again, the variable of interest is the share of airtime devoted 
to social actors 1 to 22. The differences in the distribution of airtime across social actors between Rai and 
Mediaset are significant. A more detailed analysis (not presented here) reveals that, excluding differences 
with a 90% significance level, the Rai newscasts devote a higher share of airtime to supranational subjects, 
the European Union, constitutional subjects, non-Italian political and institutional subjects, associations 
relevant for social pluralism, trade unions, professional associations and persons related to arts and culture. 
On the other hand, Mediaset gives more coverage to public institutions, military and police forces, mass 
media, professionals, criminals and ordinary people. The newscasts do not differ in terms of the coverage 
of other social actors.  
 
The impact of exogenous factors on social pluralism 
The evaluation of social pluralism over several years is important as is the assessment of its stability 
(Iosifidis, 2010; Sukosd et al., 2015). Table 2 shows substantial intra-group and inter-group social pluralism. 
At the same time, the distribution of airtime across social actors within each group changes over time and 
that the variability is similar in each group (Figures 1 and 2). The same exogenous factors seem to change 
the incentive to cover different social actors through the news or speaking time. In what follows, we assess 
the impact of changes in the political majority (thus changes in government) on the measure of social 
pluralism in the Rai and Mediaset newscasts. Section 2 outlined the extraordinary scenario of the Italian 
mass media being inextricably linked with political affairs. While Silvio Berlusconi was the leader of the 
centre-right political coalition for a long time, his family still controlled a media corporation that included 
Mediaset and its television channels. If Rai and Mediaset, as shown in Table 1, devote airtime attention to 
different social actors, this difference may have shrunk when Berlusconi and his coalition controlled the 
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public TV channels. Thus, the objective of the rest of the paper is to assess the impact of Berlusconi’s III 
cabinet on social pluralism (May 2008-November 2011).  
In addition, we control for other exogenous factors: the digital transition (2008-2012) and the economic 
recession (2009 to date). The digital transition began in 2008 and was fully operative in 2012. During this 
period, Rai, Mediaset and other groups launched new digital TV channels, many of which specialized in 
specific content (for example cartoons, news and sport). At the same time, Mediaset and Sky developed 
digital terrestrial or satellite pay-tv channels to satisfy viewers with heterogeneous preferences. Hence, the 
higher availability of specialized channels may have changed both Rai and Mediaset's interest in covering 
different social actors during the newscasts.  
Similarly, the financial and economic crisis, which officially started at the end of 2008 and was still ongoing 
in Italy in 2014, could have involved more focus on specific categories of social actors, such as economic 
institutions or trade unions. This would then have affected the dispersion of broadcasting time across social 
actors, as well as concentrating the interest of both groups on similar actors, therefore reducing the inter-
group differences. 
Table 3 shows the results of an Ordinary Least Square analysis with, as the dependent variable, the 
normalized standard deviation of the coverage of social actors within the Rai and Mediaset newscasts 
(internal pluralism). The index is similar to that proposed by George and Oberholzer-Gee (2011), who 
calculated the standard deviation in category word shares across local TV stations, in order to measure 
issue diversity. The explanatory and control variables are a dummy variable equal to 1 if Berlusconi was the 
prime minister, 0 otherwise (Berlusconi), inhabitants receiving digital signals (digital), the number of 
subscriptions to Sky pay TV (pay), and the GDP growth considered on a monthly basis (GDP).  
 
TABLE 3 
Dispersion of the airtime between 2008 and 2014 (internal pluralism) 
 News time  Speaking time Broadcasting time 
 Rai Mediaset Rai Mediaset Rai Mediaset 
Berlusconi -0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.102** 
(0.026) 
-0.176*** 
(0.035) 
-0.106** 
(0.022) 
-0.057** 
(0.010) 
-0.101** 
(0.021) 
digital -0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.093* 
(0.044) 
-0.059* 
((0.034) 
-0.044* 
(0.028) 
-0.042 
(0.026) 
pay -0.253 -0.428 -1.343* -1.786 -0.704 -1.338 
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Notes. OLS, standard errors in parentheses. The variable Berlusconi is a dummy. Other variables are 
in natural logs. Significance level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, p***<0.01. 
 
The dispersion of airtime across social actors is lower when Berlusconi was the prime minister. The 
magnitude and significance of the effect are similar in the two groups. The digital transition has a similar 
effect, although it is not always significant: the higher availability of content reduces the dispersion of 
airtime across social actors. The GDP exerts a (negative) significant effect on the dispersion of airtime 
across social actors: a higher GDP growth is combined with a higher homogeneity of the airtime devoted to 
social actors.  
A similar analysis is applied to inter-group differences (external pluralism). Table 4 presents the dissimilarity 
between the Rai and Mediaset distribution of broadcasting time. The index of dissimilarity is the following: 
 
Where, at time t, xi and yi are the airtime devoted to social actor i by Rai and Mediaset respectively, and X 
and Y are the total newscast airtime. 
(0.555) (0.668) (0.781) (1.089) (0.598) (0.848) 
GDP -2.190*** 
(0.725) 
-2.063** 
(0.892) 
-5.271*** 
(1.160) 
-5.487*** 
(1.618) 
-3.435*** 
(0.888) 
-4.081*** 
(1.260) 
constant 28.885** 
(11.739) 
28.832** 
(14.115) 
75.171*** 
(16.507) 
81.108*** 
(23.022) 
47.635*** 
(12.631) 
60.541*** 
(17.917) 
R2 0.393 0.406 0.569 0.378 0.484 0.382 
DW statistics 1.973 1.782 2.345 2.123 2.013 2.349 
n 72 72 72 72 72 72 
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TABLE 4 
Dissimilarity between Rai and Mediaset, 2008-2014 (external pluralism) 
 
 
 
Notes. OLS, standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, p***<0.01. 
 
Table 4 highlights two main results. First, the impact of the exogenous factors is not high. This result 
confirms the previous findings: the sequence of events affected the Rai and Mediaset distribution of 
airtime in a similar way. If Rai and Mediaset differ significantly in terms of attention devoted to social 
actors, this differentiation has been relatively stable, and public and private groups have adopted a sort of 
“social counterprogramming” over the years. Second, when Berlusconi was in power, the differentiation 
was less strong in terms of news time, speaking time and broadcasting time. This effect does not increase 
the significance of the whole model. However, the combination of private and public “control” of free-to-
air television is clearly associated with a lower degree of external social pluralism. 
 
 News time Speaking time Broadcasting time 
Berlusconi -0.037** 
(0.012) 
-0.016* 
(0.010) 
-0.159** 
(0.049) 
digital 0.055 
(0.059) 
0.017 
(0.030) 
0.023 
(0.040) 
pay -2.456 
(1.921) 
-0.594 
(0.974) 
-0.647 
(1.293) 
GDP -5.214 
(2.854) 
1.027 
(1.446) 
-0.685 
(1.920) 
constant 84.827 
(40.595) 
-3.655 
(20.574) 
0.529 
(27.311) 
R2 0.269 0.122 0.396 
DW statistics 1.678 1.992 2.014 
n 72 72 72 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the characteristics of social pluralism in the most popular Italian free-to-air TV 
groups: Rai, a state-controlled company, and Mediaset, controlled by Silvio Berlusconi’s family. In this 
study, social pluralism is defined by the distribution of airtime (news time and speaking time) across 22 
classes of social actors. The research had three objectives: first, to assess the intensity of internal pluralism, 
that is, the distribution of airtime across different actors within the same group. Second, to measure the 
differences between the two groups, again in terms of time devoted to “cover” social categories with news 
or speaking time. Third, to study whether exogenous factors, such as changes in the political majority, have 
affected the distribution of airtime across social actors. We conducted this research using data collected by 
AgCom between 2008 and 2014. Although the classification of social actors and the AgCom methodology 
could be refined, the data provide the opportunity to observe social media pluralism in action and measure 
it.  
The results can be summarized as follows. The Rai group exhibits a greater internal social pluralism than 
Mediaset. Within the Rai group, Rai 1 and Rai 2 (the most popular public channels) present a sort of 
coordination in the distribution of airtime over social actors, while Rai 3 shows differs substantially from 
the other two Rai channels. Regarding external pluralism, the difference between Rai and Mediaset is 
significant and stable over time: some social actors systematically obtain more news and speaking time in 
the Rai newscasts, while others obtain more time in the Mediaset group7. Some institutional factors have 
had an impact on social pluralism. First, a favourable economic trend and the position of Silvio Berlusconi as 
prime minister negatively affected the dispersion of airtime across social actors (internal pluralism). 
Second, when Berlusconi was in power, the difference between the private and public television groups 
(external pluralism) was less pronounced.  
The last finding is interesting in the light of the theory of content differentiation in media industries. In fact, 
a well debated theoretical result, originally proposed by Steiner (1952), is that advertising financed media 
focuses on popular content in order to maximize the “audience” and the advertisers’ willingness to pay. A 
corollary is that without serious competitors in the market, a media monopolist will broadcast 
heterogeneous content to meet both the mass and niche preferences of consumers. Although several 
studies have amended Steiner’s result and found important exceptions, the intuition of the original model 
still explains the frequent tendency of media companies to offer similar content.  
This paper focuses on a special kind of content differentiation: the airtime devoted to different social actors 
in free-to-air television. The variable of interest in the paper is the distribution of time/space over different 
actors/issues. This point raises two important caveats. First, the content is already “internally 
differentiated” within each newscast, since the attention is distributed amongst multiple and different 
social actors. Second, the TV channels cannot interrupt the newscasts to broadcast advertising. Hence, the 
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link between the choice of content, the maximization of audience and the advertisers’ willingness to pay is 
less strong compared to the case of entertainment or sport content. The data cannot thus generate a 
minimal differentiation result in a Steiner-like way. Rather, the public broadcasting service seems to ensure 
a sort of “social counter-programming”, at least when the same company/family does not directly or 
indirectly control both the public and the private TV groups.   
These issues are part of a broader debate regarding the role and desirability of state-controlled TV 
companies. Several politicians, experts and economists argue that the justification for public TV is less clear 
than in the past (Brown, 1996; Collins et al., 2001; Armstrong, 2005; Hargreaves Heap, 2005; Bardoel and 
d'Haenens, 2008). Efficiency concerns, the risk of a conflict of interest between TV groups and political 
power, and the uncertain quality of services suggest the need for a reduction in public intervention in 
broadcasting and more space for private companies. For example, the representation of social classes in 
media outlets might be achieved by a regulation imposed on private companies if public broadcasting was 
abandoned. Unfortunately, the theoretical and empirical work on the theme has not clarified all the 
consequences of abandoning public TV, especially if some media moguls have a political agenda. In many 
countries, broadcast television is still the most important means for distinct social actors to be visible and 
express their ideas. However, “marginal” social actors struggle to be represented and to express their 
views, because their direct or indirect TV appearance does not maximize the broadcasters’ advertising 
revenues. State-controlled TV stations can alleviate these problems, because the profit constraints are less 
binding, and can guarantee an adequate media coverage for majority and minority social actors. 
The analysis presented in this paper has some limitations. First, we only considered the airtime devoted to 
social actors during newscasts. This was dictated by the larger newscast audiences compared to other 
programs, as well as by the regularity of newscast audiences in TV channels: regularity and reliability of 
time schedules stabilize the unit of analysis and make the data across TV groups more homogeneous and 
easily comparable. However, public and private TV channels have other formats, such as talk shows or 
journalistic special reports, where politicians, experts and ordinary people state their views and challenge 
each other’s opinions. Some of these programs focus heavily on social actors and present and discuss their 
perspectives in detail. Talk shows and special reports are strongly dependent on the events that put various 
actors in the public eye. This might thus increase the skewness of the airtime distribution in the short run, 
because such events also alter the distribution of broadcasting time in the newscasts. Thus, future research 
should consider the total broadcasting time of TV channels to better assess the space devoted to each 
social actor.  
Another limitation regards the actual impact of social pluralism on TV viewers. In fact, we did not consider 
the absolute or relative audience of private and public newscasts. A TV company can try to adequately 
represent all actors in a society, which can also be observed in the data. At the same time, if such a TV 
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broadcaster reaches a small proportion of total TV viewers, the “reflective” social pluralism achieved is not 
really effective. While we reduced this bias by focusing on the two most popular broadcasting companies, 
we believe that future research should deal with the efficacy of social pluralism and its actual perception by 
citizens. In addition, we did not take into account the possibility that many people watch the newscasts of 
both public and private TV channels8. Should this occur frequently, the concerns regarding the lack of social 
pluralism would be alleviated, because our data reveal an objective differentiation between private and 
public TV in terms of distribution of airtime across social actors. 
Finally, we assumed that the more airtime devoted to a social actor, the higher the interest in “favouring” 
that actor and his/her views. However, some argue that while speaking time is a real opportunity for an 
actor to express his/her views without mediation, news time can include both positive and negative reports 
(Durante and Knight, 2012)9. Therefore, if two competing channels devote the same news time to a social 
actor, it is not clear whether they adopt the same attitude towards that actor. In reality, the speaking time 
is also not necessarily “positive” for the actor involved. For example, a TV journalist can emphasize the 
weaknesses of a particular opinion during an interview. Future work should thus investigate whether this 
empirical bias can be partially corrected.  
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NOTES 
1. More precisely, the Italian public broadcasting service is controlled by the central government.  
2. For example, some argue that individuals with more liberal views pay more attention to themes such as world 
affairs, labour and social issues, while conservative viewers are more interested in issues such as law and 
order, immigration and security (Durante and Knight, 2012). This issue fits the Italian economic and 
institutional situation particularly well, because the most popular private TV channels are controlled by the 
family of Silvio Berlusconi, who had been the leader of the right wing coalition since 1993, and thus are 
expected to reflect the views of more conservative citizens.  
3. To overcome this difficulty, Rennhoff and Wilbur (2014) propose a market-based measure of viewpoint 
diversity. In relation to local television news, Rennhoff and Wilbur (2014) found that viewpoint diversity is 
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apparently not associated with local media market ownership. Rennhoff and Wilbur (2012) and George and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2011) obtained similar results: market structure exerts little influence on diversity. 
4. The Italian Parliament elects seven members of the Rai Administrative Council. The other two members are 
nominated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Council appoints the Director-General. The Director-
General and the members of the Administrative Council are appointed for a renewable three-year term. 
5. Auditel is a company that collects audience data. Its shareholders comprise all Italian public and private 
television companies as well as advertiser and advertising agency associations.  
6. The significance of Cramer’s V is the same as is calculated with Pearson's chi-squared test. 
7. The association between favouring certain social actors and a right/left political orientation raises several 
issues, which we leave for future work. 
8. See Brosius et al. (1992) and Meyer and Muthaly (2008) for related research. Unfortunately, no study reports 
concrete results regarding the loyalty of viewers to TV channels.  
9. Although the majority of journalists view themselves as “neutral”, they can still involuntarily affect the 
perceptions of the public (McCarthy and Dolfsma, 2014). 
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